

Top Secret

NSA review completed



Twenty-Fourth Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

**(This report covers the period from
31 July through 6 August 1973)**

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

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6 August 1973

DIA review(s)
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SPECIAL NOTE

Preliminary analysis of [] satellite photography, []

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[] has provided comprehensive coverage of many important intelligence targets in the northern half of North Vietnam. The photography, []

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[] shows high levels of activity between the China-North Vietnam border and Hanoi. It also shows considerable flooding in areas northeast of Hanoi (which is normal for this time of year), and a moderate amount of activity in the facilities and anchorages of Haiphong port. []

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[] logistic movements between Hanoi and the Chinese border were very heavy. Activity observed on the railroad between Hanoi and the border point at Dong Dang was at levels as high as have been observed in any previous photography. A number of trains were seen on the main line and large numbers of rail cars were observed in key rail yards. At this stage of analyzing the photographs, roughly 4,000 vehicles have been counted in the major truck parks at Dong Dang and near Kep, more than have ever previously been seen at these locations. Most of the vehicles appear to be cargo and utility trucks, or construction equipment. In this first phase of the readout no military equipment has been noted, although some of the trucks are almost certainly destined for military units.

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The level of logistic activity noted in this photography confirms recent indications in communications intelligence and other sources that a high volume of imports has been moving overland from China into North Vietnam in recent months. Many of the cargoes specifically identified in intercepted messages of recent weeks have been food or economic goods to be used in the reconstruction of the North Vietnamese economy.

Detailed analysis of the new photography is under way, and further reports will be submitted as this analysis continues.

7 August 1973

Twenty-Fourth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*

(This report covers the week from
31 July through 6 August 1973)

The Key Points

- No new North Vietnamese personnel were detected beginning the infiltration trip south during the week. About 300 non-combat specialists, who had started the trip a few weeks ago, were observed for the first time farther south in the infiltration system.
- North Vietnamese logistic activity remained at low to moderate rainy season levels in all areas except northern South Vietnam, where logistic activity--both military and civilian--has been high ever since the 27 January settlement agreement.
- Combat activity was at a moderate level in South Vietnam. Very little combat occurred in Laos.
- In Cambodia, information received during the week suggests that the Khmer Communists have clandestinely infiltrated significant numbers of troops through Cambodian army lines and into Phnom Penh, where they are for the present awaiting orders to surface.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the twenty-fourth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

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I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments

1. No new North Vietnamese combat troops were detected beginning the infiltration trip to the south during the past week. Fifteen small groups of specialists who had begun their infiltration trip some weeks ago, however, were detected for the first time during the week. These groups contain a total of about 300 men, most of whom are civilian specialists.

2. Our estimate of North Vietnamese personnel who have entered the infiltration pipeline since the 15 June effective date of the "second" ceasefire now stands at about 5,000 men. Some 4,000 of these have been combat replacement troops, and the remainder have been specialists. The estimated total number of infiltrators since the original 27 January ceasefire now stands at over 55,000 North Vietnamese personnel. Over 30,000 of these started south since 27

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January, and the other 25,000 were already on the infiltration trails traveling south as of that date. (ANNEX B, [] contains a more detailed discussion of the information pertaining to infiltration received during the past week.)

3. Recent evidence suggests that one battalion of a North Vietnamese infantry regiment in southern Laos may have returned to North Vietnam and may have been replaced by a AAA support battalion. It is as yet unclear whether the movement of this battalion presages a further reduction in NVA combat forces or is a reflection of the changing NVA logistics pattern in the Laotian Panhandle. Two other combat units have departed southern Laos during the last two months--an infantry regiment which returned to North Vietnam and an AAA regiment which moved across the border into South Vietnam. In addition, of course, a number of non-combat units servicing the NVA's logistic and infiltration routes in southern Laos have also moved across the border into South Vietnam.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies

North Vietnam

4. Logistic movements continued at a moderate level both in the Vinh area and in the southern Panhandle of North Vietnam. The movements at Vinh included small shipments of arms and ammunition, which are apparently being shuttled between storage locations. [] one NVA storage facility outside Vinh shipped nearly 25 tons of ammunition southward to a logistic unit near Quang Khe. The following day, another 25 tons of ammunition were observed moving south from Vinh and [] an additional 20 tons of ammunition were observed traveling from Vinh to Quang Khe.

5. In the southern Panhandle, a substantial volume of activity was again detected between Quang Khe and the DMZ. [] an NVA logistic unit at the Gianh River port

in Quang Binh Province had received over 3,800 tons of food during an unspecified recent period, as well as some military supplies (amount and type not reported). The goods were to be transported farther inland from the port facility by truck. On 27 July, another NVA logistic unit in Quang Binh Province had nearly 290 tons of foodstuffs and 135 tons of ammunition in storage, according to good evidence. [redacted]

[redacted] yet another logistic unit in this area had 340 tons of cargo in stock, including some 290 tons of weapons.


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Laos and Cambodia

6. North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos was at a low level during the week. Some instances of resupply movement were observed in the southern part of the Laotian Panhandle, but because of the rainy season most of the roads were apparently incapable of supporting large-scale activity. On 1 August, an NVA storage facility northwest of Ban Bac, probably located on Route 99, received 15 supply vehicles carrying machinery and hardware. On the same day, it was reported that another unit in the same area had received 40 vehicles in an unspecified period, 30 of which were transporting agricultural equipment. Farther south, in the tri-border area, activity appears to be at a standstill. As of 30 July, the two major exit routes from the southern Panhandle--Route 975 to Stung Treng in Cambodia and Route 96/110 into Kontum Province of South Vietnam--were closed to traffic and there was no evidence of repair work on either one. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers mentioned in this report.)

South Vietnam

7. The pace of logistic activity along the Communists' new "western supply corridor" in South Vietnam is still very high. Reports received during the week detailed the large-scale movement of NVA supply vehicles and the existence of substantial stockpiles along the primary north-south routes in western South



Vietnam. [] an NVA storage facility on Route 548 received 46 cargo vehicles loaded with rice; on 28 July, the same unit received 51 vehicles carrying unidentified cargo. On the same day, another NVA logistic unit in the area received 109 supply vehicles, and [] 17 cargo trucks were detected on Route 616 southeast of Khe Sanh, and 41 trucks were seen on Route 548 north of A Shau. [] a storage facility on Route 548 reportedly had over 1,100 tons of cargo in storage, and [] one of the two major NVA logistic units operating on the western corridor had nearly 3,000 tons of munitions remaining in storage. [] there were 80 cargo vehicles on Route 548 north of A Shau.

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8. The Communists are also continuing to move cargo in other areas of northern South Vietnam, although at somewhat lower levels than on the western corridor. [] 31 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 9 between the Laos/South Vietnam border and the junction with Route 6088. [] 60 cargo trucks were observed on Route 9 between Dong Ha and the Laos/SVN border and on the following day, there were 59 cargo vehicles on the same Route.

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9. Communist logistic activity also continues to be heavy in the Cua Viet River area of northeastern Quang Tri Province. A compilation of reports received during the week indicates that some 50 vehicles per day were traveling through this area from []

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II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

A. South Vietnam

10. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15 June, and for the last week (31 Jul-6 Aug) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since 27 January "Ceasefire"		Total Since 15 June "Ceasefire"		Last Week (31 Jul-6 Aug)	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,119	3,810	94	451	23	92
MR 2	365	2,607	101	753	12	88
MR 3	490	3,346	88	770	13	117
MR 4	836	7,767	158	1,601	26	257
Totals	2,810	17,530	441	3,575	74 (80)	554 (555) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

11. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the charts on the following pages, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

B. Laos


12. Communist-initiated combat activity in Laos remained at a low level during the reporting period. In Laos Military Region III, two government positions northwest of Dong Hene were attacked by Communist company-sized units on 1 and 3 August. Other government forces clashed with NVA/PL company-sized units southwest of Muong Phalane on 31 July and 4 August. In MR IV, small combat actions occurred on 5 and 6 August northwest of Khong Sedone.

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CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF


(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)





CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



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III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

Infiltration of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Communists

13. The Khmer Communists (KC) probably have infiltrated significant numbers of combat troops into Phnom Penh in recent weeks. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
nine KC battalions began to infiltrate the capital earlier in that month. (We do not know the size of these battalions, but each of them probably contains no more than 100 to 200 men.) [REDACTED]
that these troops, who it claims are all native to the Phnom Penh area, entered the city disguised as refugees and laborers. Their instructions were to hide with relatives and await orders to surface and disrupt government activities in the city. Although small groups of KC combat forces and civilians have entered Phnom Penh clandestinely in the past, the infiltration of nine battalions would bring a new order of magnitude to the threat from within Phnom Penh. The report indicates that the recent effort of the Cambodian government to conscript more soldiers into the FANK has caused many of these infiltrators to flee the city. The conscription campaign has stalled after the first few days of its implementation, however, and a number of the infiltrators have probably already returned to the city.

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Khmer Communist Units Around Phnom Penh Receiving Increased Ammunition Shipments

14. During the week, a number of intercepted messages from Khmer Communist units have discussed ammunition shipments to forces surrounding Phnom Penh. Most of the ammunition mentioned in the messages has been U.S. ammunition captured from FANK, and there is no doubt that recent captures by KC units have been sizable. For example, over 100 tons of ammunition were picked up by the insurgents when they overran FANK Mekong defenses near Baren during late July. Included in this capture were over 500 rounds of 105mm

artillery ammunition and a large, but unspecified, number of 120mm mortar rounds. The recently intercepted messages have indicated that ammunition destined for the capital area was to be "delivered immediately" by jeeps, trucks and bicycles.

PRG Representatives in Quang Tri Province Receive Supplies from Mongolia

15. According to Communist radio broadcasts, a shipment of aid goods from the Mongolian Peoples Republic to the PRG was received at Dong Ha in northern Quang Tri Province on 24 July. The broadcasts allege that Mongolia will provide 2,400 tons of such aid in 1973. Although the type of goods involved was not disclosed, the broadcast account of the turnover ceremony at Dong Ha, and the fact that Mongolia's military resources are extremely limited, suggest that the aid is probably economic. An earlier report [redacted] had indicated that Mongolia had given the PRG in Quang Tri Province a herd of cattle, but that most of the cattle had died shortly after arriving in South Vietnam.

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ANNEX B

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North
Vietnamese Personnel to the South

1. No new regular combat infiltration groups were observed at any point in the pipeline during the reporting period. Fifteen small infiltration groups, however, with an aggregate strength of about 300 specialists, were detected in northern South Vietnam and the Laotian Panhandle. These groups, containing mainly civilian personnel, are all destined for the central coastal area of South Vietnam, where the infiltration of combat troops has been concentrated in recent weeks.

2. Table 1 below shows the infiltration of combat troops since 1 September 1972, by destination, while Table 2 summarizes total infiltration starts,--including specialists--since 1 January 1973.

Table 1

Infiltration Starts: Combat Troops
Leaving North Vietnam for the South,
by Destination*

	<u>1 Sep 1972-30 Jun 1973**</u>	<u>1 Jul-6 Aug 1973</u>
Total	<u>94,000</u>	<u>3,100</u>
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	33,000 (CIA) , 36,000 (DOD)	0
MR 5	9,000	3,100
B-3 Front	14,000 (CIA) , 11,000 (DOD)	0
COSVN	26,000	0
Southern Laos and MR 559	12,000	0

* This table includes only combat infiltration groups, and omits special-purpose groups. There are minor differences between the DOD and the CIA concerning the number of personnel destined for specific areas listed on this table. Where such differences exist both the CIA and the DOD estimates are given.

** For accounting purposes, we arbitrarily define the "infiltration year" as beginning on 1 September, which roughly coincides with the start of the dry season along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Laos Panhandle each year.

Table 2

Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 January 1973

	<u>Total^{1/}</u>	<u>Special-Purpose</u>
January	20,000	1,600
February	10,200	2,100
March	3,250	2,250
April	1,925	1,200
May	7,175	300
June 1-15	825	325
June 16-30	1,375	375
July 1-15	1,900	175
July 16-31	1,750	425
August 1-6	0	0

^{1/} Including gap-filled groups, except groups 7001-7009 and 5057. Assuming that these groups departed after 1 January, about 5,000 combat troops would be added to the infiltration starts shown above.

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